ICO vs. Equity Financing Under Imperfect, Complex and Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Equity, Envy and Efficiency under Asymmetric Information
The set of fair (i.e. envy free and efficient) allocation rules may be empty in wellbehaved pure exchange economies if the agents are asymmetrically informed at the time of contracting. In addition, there may exist efficient allocation rules such that every agent envies another.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3539017