Ideological versus Downsian political competition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Repeated Downsian electoral competition
We analyze an infinitely repeated version of the Downsian model of elections. The folk theorem suggests that a wide range of policy paths can be supported by subgame perfect equilibria when parties and voters are sufficiently patient. We go beyond this result by giving separate weak conditions on the patience of voters and the patience of parties under which every policy path can be supported. ...
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This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where 1 no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing policy 2 platforms and observe eachother’s choices, for one party to change position so 3 as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is 4 sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is...
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This paper studies two-party electoral competition in a setting where no policy is unbeatable. It is shown that if parties take turns in choosing platforms and observe each other’s choices, altering one’s policy platform so as to win is pointless since the other party never accepts an outcome where it is sure to loose. If there is any cost to changing platform, the prediction is that the game e...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2002
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100132