Idiosyncratic Sentiments and Coordination Failures

Coordination Failures

On Coordinating Coordination Failures

This paper examines whether a principal with limited knowledge of agents’ actions can use an income tax scheme to uniquely implement the Pareto optimal equilibrium in a coordination game (i.e. a game with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria). We show that, in contrast to games with externalities but a unique equilibrium, implementation in coordination games fails generically unless the identity o...

Equilibria with Coordination Failures

This paper extends the literature on equilibria with coordination failures to arbitrary convex sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a unified treatment to all cases consider...

Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games∗

We study experimentally how changes in the information structure affect behavior in regime change coordination games with incomplete information (global games). We find two systematic departures from the theory: (1) the comparative statics of equilibrium thresholds and signal precision are reversed, and (2) as information becomes very precise subjects’behavior approximates the effi cient equili...

Decentralized Coordination with Crash Failures

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I thank my adviser, Professor Gul Agha, and the members of the Open Systems Laboratory for supporting my work with their time, resources and ideas. The study described in this thesis is a continuation of a project done in collaboration with Together we built all the infrastructure used in developing this thesis, I have made only relatively small improvements. Since the original ...