Ignorance is Bliss: The Screening Effect of (Noisy) Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Science Research Network
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1556-5068']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4363117