II. Linking pay and performance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Linking strategy, performance, and pay.
The appraisal portion of the strategic plan has long been a problem. How do you reward the achievement and performance of individuals as they operate the organization's strategic plan? How do you use the performance appraisal area to motivate the management team to achieve the objective in the strategic plan? How do you provide incentive for your people to stay with your organization? How do yo...
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This paper studies contract selection between efficiency wages and subjective performance pay to motivate workers in a market setting. The optimal wage contract (which may be a combination of efficiency wages and subjective performance pay) is determined by turnover costs in labor markets. Specifically, labor markets with higher turnover costs use more subjective performance pay and less effici...
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In this lecture, I will talk about my work on incentive contracts, especially incentives related to moral hazard. I will provide a narrative of my intellectual journey from models narrowly focused on pay for performance to models that see the scope of the incentive problem in much broader terms featuring multitasking employees and rms making extensive use of non nancial instruments in designing...
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Performance Pay and Risk Aversion A main prediction of agency theory is the well known risk-incentive trade-off. Incentive contracts should be found in environments with little uncertainty and for agents with low degrees of risk aversion. There is an ongoing debate in the literature about the first trade-off. Due to lack of data, there has so far been hardly any empirical evidence about the sec...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: British Journal of Anaesthesia
سال: 2013
ISSN: 0007-0912
DOI: 10.1093/bja/aet132