Impact of Consumer Strategic Behavior on the Supplier Channel Selection in a Retailing Platform

Flourishing online retailing has spawned the agency selling channel, which motivates suppliers to choose among traditional reselling (R), (A), and hybrid channel strategies (H). In this paper, considering a supplier retail platform facing strategic consumers, we develop Stackelberg game examine equilibrium pricing under three further analyze impact of consumer behavior on supplier’s selection. Results indicate that behaviors induce intertemporal competition, by reducing price difference between two periods. Meanwhile, competition can mitigate effect behaviors. Furthermore, supply chain members also employ different policies in accordance with respond more consumers. Specifically, prices would be raised acquire high-valued consumers Strategy H, while “small profits but quick turnover” taken pure strategies. Moreover, optimal strategy is threshold commission rate, below H preferred, R preferred otherwise, noticing A never selected. Interestingly, find supplier, platform, could better off at same time only when