Imperfect Information, Costly Litigation, and Product Quality
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Auditor Liability Rules under Imperfect Information and Costly Litigation - The Welfare Increasing Effect of Liability Insurance
This paper examines auditor liability rules under imperfect information, costly litigation and risk averse auditors. A negligence rule fails in such a setting, because in equilibrium auditors will deviate with positive probability from any given standard. It is shown that strict liability outperforms negligence with respect to risk allocation, and the probability that a desired level of care is...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Bell Journal of Economics
سال: 1981
ISSN: 0361-915X
DOI: 10.2307/3003515