Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Implementation in mixed Nash equilibrium
A mechanism implements a social choice correspondence f in mixed Nash equilibrium if, at any preference profile, the set of all (pure and mixed) Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of f -optimal alternatives for all cardinal representations of the preference profile. Unlike Maskin’s definition, our definition does not require each optimal alternative to be the outcome of a pure equ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2012.09.004