Implementation of optimal contracts under adverse selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Long Run Optimal Contracts under Adverse Selection with Limited Commitment
The paper studies long run optimal contracts under adverse selection with limited commitment so that the contracts are open to negotiation in every period. Thus the contracting game is repeated over multiple periods and belief about the type of the agent is updated by the principal. We study both the finite-horizon case as well as the infinite-horizon case and find that the unique perfect Bayes...
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It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentivecompatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal con...
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در این تحقیق به مطالعه وجود انتخاب نامساعد(کژ گزینی) در بازار بیمه درمان تکمیلی ایران پرداخته شده است. داده های مورد نیاز توسط پرسشنامه و به روش نمونه گیری خوشه ای جمع آوری شده است. پرسشنامه ها در میان افراد شاغل ساکن شهر تهران توریع شد. در این تحقیق با استفاده از تخمین دو مدل لجستیک و به دست آوردن ضریب همبستگی میان تقاضای بیمه درمان تکمیلی و رخداد خسارت به بررسی موضوع مورد نظر پرداخته شده است....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Design
سال: 2001
ISSN: 1434-4742
DOI: 10.1007/pl00013694