Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of 8-Round Deoxys-BC-256
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis on Deoxys-BC-256
Deoxys is a final-round candidate of the CAESAR competition. Deoxys is built upon an internal tweakable block cipher Deoxys-BC, where in addition to the plaintext and key, it takes an extra non-secret input called a tweak. This paper presents the first impossible differential cryptanalysis of Deoxys-BC-256 which is used in Deoxys as an internal tweakable block cipher. First, we find a 4.5-round...
متن کاملImpossible-Differential and Boomerang Cryptanalysis of Round-Reduced Kiasu-BC
Kiasu-BC is a tweakable block cipher proposed by Jean et al. at ASIACRYPT 2014 alongside their TWEAKEY framework. The cipher is almost identical to the AES-128 except for the tweak, which renders it an attractive primitive for various modes of operation and applications requiring tweakable block ciphers. Therefore, studying how the additional tweak input affects security compared to that of the...
متن کاملImpossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced Round SIMON
Impossible differential is a useful method for cryptanalysis. SIMON is a light weight block cipher that has attracted lots of attention ever since its publication in 2013. In this paper we propose impossible differential attack on five versions of SIMON, using bit conditions to minimize key bits guessed. We calculate keybits and give the exact attack results.
متن کاملImpossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round SKINNY
SKINNY is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher family proposed by Beierle et al. at CRYPTO 2016. SKINNY has 6 main variants where SKINNY-n-t is a block cipher that operates on n-bit blocks using t-bit tweakey (key and tweak) where n = 64 or 128 and t = n, 2n, or 3n. In this paper, we present impossible differential attacks against reduced-round versions of all the 6 members of the SKINNY fa...
متن کاملImpossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round LBlock
In this paper, we improve the impossible differential attack on 20-round LBlock given in the design paper of the LBlock cipher. Using relations between the round keys we attack on 21-round and 22-round LBlock with a complexity of 2 and 2 encryptions respectively. We use the same 14-round impossible differential characteristic observed by the designers to attack on 21 rounds and another 14-round...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2018.2808484