Impression Management and Non-GAAP Disclosure in Earnings Announcements
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Non-GAAP Earnings for Contracting and Financial Disclosure
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Business Finance & Accounting
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0306-686X
DOI: 10.1111/jbfa.12238