In defence of constitutive rules

Abstract Although the notion of constitutive rule has played an important role in metaphysical debate social and legal philosophy, several authors perceive it as somewhat mysterious ambiguous: idea a specific kind rules that are supposed to be “magically” reality seems suspicious, more rationalistic fiction than genuine explanation. For these reasons, reductionist approaches have been put forward deflate explanatory this notion. In paper, I will instead try defend rules. My thesis is explanatorily helpful because gives complete account phenomenon domain, namely, artifactual entities endowed with statuses can emergent normative properties. Conceiving rule-constituted artifacts part what H. L. A. Hart called “the internal point view” toward law, for reason should included explanation view integral life institutions. The structure my argument follows. First, provide example view, fact individuals reactions not about regulation institution but its underlying purpose rationale—what domain ratio norm. Then identify two reductionistic on first approach exemplified by Brian Epstein’s phenomena explained better terms (grounding/anchoring) relations. second reductionism (held authors, among whom Alf Ross, Riccardo Guastini, Frank Hindriks, Francesco Guala) accounted regulative plus certain terminology. show neither explain from view: While cannot reaction strongly normative, entity. Constitutive both things preserved analysis institutional ontology. By way we create something: immaterial, rule-based