Inaction in Macro-prudential Supervision: Assessing the EU’s Response

crisis: in search of externalities for macro prudential supervision

Optimal Macro-Prudential and Monetary Policy∗

This paper addresses two main questions. First, it examines the implications of financial frictions, embedded in a New Keynesian DSGE model with a banking sector, for the conduct of welfare-optimal monetary policy. Assuming only one monetary instrument, we analyse how financial frictions affect the gains from commitment and how different are the optimized simple rules with and without financial...

Stefan Gerlach: Macro prudential policy in Ireland

Today I will talk about “Macro prudential policy in Ireland.” Unfortunately, recent financial sector developments across the world have shown the serious consequences of macro prudential policy failures. Thus, there is little doubt that, in Ireland and elsewhere, much attention must and will be paid in the future to ensuring that macro prudential frameworks are effective so that we can avoid ev...

Central Bank Independence and Macro- prudential Regulation

We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social o...

Financial liberalization, prudential supervision, and the onset of banking crises

We examine what is perceived as one of the main culprits in the occurrence of banking crises: financial liberalization. As is typically argued, if liberalization is accompanied by insufficient prudential supervision of the banking sector, it will result in excessive risk taking by financial intermediaries and a subsequent crisis. Having evaluated the empirical validity of this hypothesis, we co...