Incarceration and Household Asset Ownership
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Renegotiation of Asset Ownership
Asset reallocation is often observed in disintegration, divestures, and dissolution of business firms. Yet the property right theory of the firm assumes that asset ownership cannot be renegotiated when business relationships are severed. This paper shows that this assumption is quite innocuous: allowing renegotiation of asset ownership has essentially no effects on the
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Demography
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0070-3370,1533-7790
DOI: 10.1007/s13524-016-0519-1