Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets
We study the manipulability of stable matching mechanisms. To quantify incentives to manipulate stable mechanisms, we consider markets with random cardinal utilities, which induce ordinal preferences over match partners. We show that most agents in large matching markets are close to being indifferent overall stable matchings. In oneto-one matching, the utility gain by manipulating a stable mec...
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First, we summarize definitions and related theorems of asymptotic statistics in Section A. We prove Theorems in Section B. Lastly, Section C contains additional simulation results. A Asymptotic Statistics We summarize some results of asymptotic statistics from (Serfling, 1980). Let X1, X2, . . . and X be random variables on a probability space (Ω,A, P ). We say that Xn converges in probability...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2016
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdw041