Incentive Jamming-Based Secure Routing in Decentralized Internet of Things

This article focuses on the secure routing problem in decentralized Internet of Things (IoT). We consider a typical IoT scenario composed peer legitimate devices, unauthorized devices (eavesdroppers), and selfish helper jamming (jammers), propose novel incentive jamming-based scheme. For pair source destination, we first provide theoretical modeling to reveal how transmission security performance given route is related power jammers IoT. Then, design an mechanism with which pays some rewards stimulate artificial among jammers, also develop two-stage Stackelberg game framework determine optimal power. Finally, help as well setting results, formulate shortest weighted path-finding identify for data delivery between source-destination pair, can be solved by employing Dijkstra's or Bellman-Ford algorithm. prove that proposed scheme individually rational, stable, distributed, computationally efficient. Simulation numerical results are provided demonstrate our