Incentive Mechanism and Subsidy Design for Continuous Monitoring of Energy Consumption in Public Buildings (CMECPB): An Overview Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Rapid urbanization and the continued expansion of buildings have resulted in a consistent rise energy consumption buildings. At same time, monitoring building has to achieve goals an “Emission peak” “Carbon neutrality”. Numerous systems been established several types public However, there is need ensure that data are continuously acquired superior quality. Scholars noted in-depth research connected continuous (CMECPB) currently sparse. As result, additional precise quantitative studies targeting behavior various stakeholders also lacking. Hence, explore definition value dynamic benefits relevant subjects based on evolutionary game theory propose incentive policies. This paper constructs model for CMECPB between service company (ESCO) its owner study evolution path system evolutionarily stable strategy under market-based mechanisms. Furthermore, by introducing government actions, policies subsidy different interest probed detail developing principal-agent strength. The following conclusions can be reached: (1) it inefficient risky rely only ESCO achieving optimal Pareto equilibrium; (2) incentives “fixed incentives” case information symmetry + variable incentive” asymmetry; (3) choice influenced cost effort coefficient, risk aversion, external uncertainty, integrated transformation coefficient; (4) intensity should determined comprehensive analysis with multiple indicators conventional project particular project. An understanding each component pathway yields insights into overcoming challenges saving. results may useful targeted, effective disciplines promoting progress efficiency.