Incentive Mechanism of Prefabrication in Mega Projects with Reputational Concerns
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Sustainability
سال: 2018
ISSN: 2071-1050
DOI: 10.3390/su10041260