Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson’s Law in project management

نویسندگان

چکیده

• Providing incentive schemes that eliminate or mitigate Parkinson’s Law. Our are also invulnerable to group strategy. Resulting benefits project performance substantial and robust. Project management is a business process supports about 30% of the world’s economic activity. Yet projects routinely suffer from influence This behavioural phenomenon results in failure deliver work completed early before its assigned deadline. As consequence, late completion other not offset, overall suffers. Hence, success rates below 40% widely reported. uses mechanism design within non-cooperative game theory. A particular issue possibility worker with multiple dependent tasks can improve their payment by falsely reporting some task times. From our review academic literature management, no scheme used practice accomplishes this. include These apply designed under either traditional Critical Path Method (CPM) planning modern Chain Management (CCPM) planning, large-scale computational study validates resulting benefit as robust across different characteristics. We provide what apparently first analytical comparison between CPM CCPM systems. The we propose simple easily implementable. recognize incentives structured differently each organization, but provides flexible basis which various practical be designed.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Operational Research

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1872-6860', '0377-2217']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.06.006