منابع مشابه
Bank incentives, contract design and bank runs
We study the Diamond-Dybvig [3] model as developed in Green and Lin [5] and Peck and Shell [7]. We dispense with the notion of a bank as a coalition of depositors. Instead, our bank is a self-interested agent with a technological advantage in recordkeeping. We examine the implications of the resulting agency problem for the design of bank contracts and the possibility of bank-run equilibria. Fo...
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Abstract: The processed potato industry is highly vertically coordina ted though the use of production contracts between growers and processors. Contracts in this industry are primarily used to combat market thinness and potato quality requirements. This study uses a two period principle-agent model to describe the incentives inherit in processing potato production contracts. Actual processor p...
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در این پایان نامه یک مولد برای چند قاب یا ابر قاب تولید شده تحت عمل نمایش یکانی تصویر برای گروه های شمارش پذیر گسسته بررسی خواهد شد. مثال هایی از این قاب ها چند قاب های گابور، ابرقاب های گابور و قاب هایی برای زیرفضاهای انتقال پایاست. نشان می دهیم که مولد چند قاب تنک نرمال شده (ابرقاب) یکتا وجود دارد به طوری که مینیمم فاصله را از ان دارد. همچنین مسایل مشابه برای قاب های دوگان مطرح شده و برخی ...
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A simple principal agent problem is experimentally investigated in which a principal repeatedly sets a wage and an agent responds by choosing an effort level. The principal's payoff is determined by the agent's effort. In a first setting the principal can only set a fixed wage in each period. In a second setting the principal has the possibility to supplement the fixed wage with a piece rate in...
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Multiuser cooperative communication significantly improves the performance of wireless communication networks. One key challenge of multiuser cooperative communication is how to design a cooperative mechanism to incentivize potential relay nodes to help a source node in its data transmission. In this paper, to address this problem, a contract-based principal-agent framework is proposed in the c...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0932-4569
DOI: 10.1628/093245612799440005