INCENTIVES FOR DISHONESTY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY WITH INTERNAL AUDITORS
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives and Compensation Schemes: An Experimental Study∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Inquiry
سال: 2020
ISSN: 0095-2583,1465-7295
DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12878