Incentives for sabotage in vertically related industries
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically - Related Industries
We show that the incentives a vertically integrated supplier may have to disadvantage or “sabotage” the activities of downstream rivals vary with both the type of sabotage and the nature of downstream competition. Cost-increasing sabotage is typically profitable under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. In contrast, demand-reducing sabotage is often profitable under Cournot competition, but ...
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This research was supported by the U.S Department of Agriculture National Research Initiative Competitive Grants Program under Cooperative Agreement No. 99354007797. We are grateful to Bob Chambers, Ethan Ligon, Tigran Melkonyan, David Zilberman, and seminar participants at Columbia University, the University of California-Berkeley, and the University of Texas-Dallas for their comments and sugg...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Regulatory Economics
سال: 2007
ISSN: 0922-680X,1573-0468
DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-9015-7