Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium∗
This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms and external search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocation of resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We find that private information may increase ...
متن کاملMoney in Search Equilibrium, in Competitive Equilibrium, and in Competitive Search Equilibrium∗
We compare three pricing mechanisms for monetary economies: bargaining (search equilibrium); price taking (competitive equilibrium); and price posting (competitive search equilibrium). We do this in a framework that, in addition to considering different mechanisms, extends existing work on the microfoundations of money by allowing a general matching technology and endogenous entry. We study how...
متن کاملCompetitive Search Equilibrium with Rehiring
This paper extends the competitive search framework by relaxing the memory loss assumption the search literature imposes after a separation. Firms rehire available former employees instead of seeking new workers to economize on recruitment costs. Unemployed workers seek a new job conditional on their expectations on rehiring. Firms post step contracts to both optimally recruit and retain worker...
متن کاملNo 832 November 2007 Incentives in Competitive Search Equilibrium Espen R . Moen and Åsa Rosén
This paper analyses the interaction between internal agency problems within firms and external search frictions when workers have private information. We show that the allocation of resources is determined by a modified Hosios Rule. We then analyze the effect of changes in the macro economic variables on the wage contract and the unemployment rate. We find that private information may increase ...
متن کاملCompetitive Pricing and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium
We consolidate and generalize some results on price determination and ef®ciency in search equilibrium. Extending models by Rubinstein and Wolinsky and by Gale, heterogeneous buyers and sellers meet according to a general matching technology and prices are determined by a general bargaining condition. When the discount rate r and search costs converge to 0, we show that prices in all exchanges a...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1013296