Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties?
We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become increasingly stringent as the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2011
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.01.011