Incentives to patients versus incentives to health care providers: The users' perspective

P Erformance Incentives for Health Care Providers

Realignment of incentives for health-care providers in China.

Inappropriate incentives as part of China's fee-for-service payment system have resulted in rapid cost increase, inefficiencies, poor quality, unaffordable health care, and an erosion of medical ethics. To reverse these outcomes, a strategy of experimentation to realign incentives for providers with the social goals of improvement in quality and efficiency has been initiated in China. This Revi...

Designing incentives for rural health care providers in developing countries

In many developing country settings, and particularly in rural areas, the implementation of anything more than very rudimentary contracts for medical care providers, including public employees, is virtually impossible. In this paper, we examine the kinds of policy levers that governments might conceivably have available to induce physicians to serve in rural areas. Using simple models of screen...

Collective versus Relative Incentives: the Agency Perspective

What is the best way of providing incentives to a team of agents? Agency theory has given a number of answers in the past three decades on the choice between collective and relative incentive provision. We present a broad overview of this rich literature through a simple model. While the early contributions emphasize the role of performance comparison and competition in motivating agents, more ...

Do Health Care Providers Respond to Demand-Side Incentives? Evidence from Indonesia

This paper exploits the sub-district randomization of Indonesia's household Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) program to analyze how the program a ects the local health care market. The CCT program is associated with increased use of midwives as the main delivery attendants. The program is associated with a 10% increase in both the number of midwives and the delivery fees charged by midwives in t...