Incentivizing Stable Path Selection in Future Internet Architectures

By delegating path control to end-hosts, future Internet architectures offer flexibility for selection. However, a concern arises that the distributed routing decisions by endhosts, in particular load-adaptive routing, can lead oscillations if selection is performed without coordination or accurate load information. Prior research has addressed this problem devising local path-selection policies global stability. little known about viability of these context, where selfish end-hosts deviate from prescribed policy such deviation beneficial their individual perspective. In order achieve network stability architectures, it essential have an incentive adopt stability-oriented policy. work, we perform first analysis stability-inducing proposed literature. Building on game-theoretic model end-host selection, show are fact incompatible with self-interest as strategies make worthwhile pursue oscillatory strategy. Therefore, networks endhosts must be enforced incentive-compatible mechanisms. We present two mechanisms and formally prove compatibility.