Incomplete and imperfect information for sales compensation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: STUDIES AND SCIENTIFIC RESEARCHES. ECONOMICS EDITION
سال: 2010
ISSN: 2344-1321,2066-561X
DOI: 10.29358/sceco.v0i15.167