INDICATIVE CONDITIONALS, RESTRICTED QUANTIFICATION, AND NAIVE TRUTH

Indicative Conditionals, Restricted Quantification, and Naive Truth

Naive Truth and Restricted Quantification: Saving Truth a whole lot Better

Restricted quanti cation poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for non-classical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain All A are B as For all x, if x is A then x is B ; but in the non-classical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where 'if ... then' is a special conditional not de nable in ...

On Indicative Conditionals

In this paper we present a new approach to evaluate indicative conditionals with respect to some background information specified by a logic program. Because the weak completion of a logic program admits a least model under the three-valued Lukasiewicz semantics and this semantics has been successfully applied to other human reasoning tasks, conditionals are evaluated under these least L-models...

Context - sensitivity and ( indicative ) conditionals

Conditionals (in particular indicatives) give rise to stand-offs that have become well known from Gibbard’s initial Sly Pete example. The stand-offs can be seen as evidence for the context-sensitivity of (indicative) conditionals and arguably do not involve disagreement. I claim that the latter feature lends credibility to an indexical treatment of indicatives. 1. Conditionals in stand-off envi...

Conditionals and Truth Functionality

Introduction The material interpretation of conditionals is commonly recognized as involving some paradoxical results. I here argue that the truth functional approach to natural language is the reason for the inadequacy of this material interpretation, since the truth or falsity of some pair of statements ‘p’ and ‘q’ cannot per se be decisive for the truth or falsity of a conditional relation ‘...