Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract An indifference principle says that your credences should be distributed uniformly over each of the possibilities you recognise. A chance deference aligned with chances. My thesis is if we are anti-Humeans about chance, then these two principles incompatible. Anti-Humeans think it possible for actual frequencies to depart from As long as recognise like this, cannot both spread evenly and defer I discuss some weaker forms which will allow

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Canadian Journal of Philosophy

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['1911-0820', '0045-5091']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2022.36