منابع مشابه
Tax Progression under Collective Wage Bargaining and Individual Effort Determination
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Collective wage bargaining is an old, yet alien concept for Chinese enterprises. It is old because it was put forward as early as in the 1980s and formalized in the 1994 Labour Law. Nonetheless, collective wage bargaining was alien to most Chinese enterprises because according to the 1994 Labour Law the implementation of collective wage bargaining was voluntary and few enterprises carried it ou...
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In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcom...
متن کاملWage bargaining and vertical differentiation∗
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 1997
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.2307/2527225