Individual evolutionary learning with many agents
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Individual evolutionary learning with many agents
Individual Evolutionary Learning (IEL) is a learning model based on the evolution of a population of strategies of an individual agent. In prior work, IEL has been shown to be consistent with the behavior of human subjects in games with a small number of agents. In this paper, we examine the performance of IEL in games with many agents. We find IEL to be robust to this type of scaling. With the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Knowledge Engineering Review
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0269-8889,1469-8005
DOI: 10.1017/s026988891200015x