Inefficiencies on linking decisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Overcoming Incentive Constraints by Linking Decisions
Consider a Bayesian collective decision problem in which the preferences of agents are private information. We provide a general demonstration that the utility costs associated with incentive constraints become negligible when the decision problem is linked with a large number of independent copies of itself. This is established by defining a mechanism in which agents must budget their represen...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Social Choice and Welfare
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0176-1714,1432-217X
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-009-0412-6