Inefficient liquidity provision
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economic Theory
سال: 2017
ISSN: 0938-2259,1432-0479
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-017-1059-7