Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Inequality, Lobbying, and Resource Allocation
This paper describes how wealth inequality may distort public resource allocation. A government seeks to allocate limited resources to productive sectors, but sectoral productivity is privately known by agents with vested interests in those sectors. They lobby the government for preferential treatment. The government—even if it honestly seeks to maximize economic efficiency—may be confounded by...
متن کاملNotes to “ Inequality , Lobbying and Resource Allocation , ”
The ratio in [A.3′] is the factor increase in the cost by an increase in the bidding expenditure by a factor of δ > 1. As wealth increases both costs decrease. Our assumption simply posits that the cost at the higher level of bidding does not fall faster than the lower cost. In particular, this assumption excludes the possibility that the costs of expending δr and r tend to converge to each oth...
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Lobbying, Trade and Renewable Resource Harvesting Richard Damania and E. Barbier The over-exploitation of renewable resources has intensified international concerns over the management of these resources. This has prompted calls for the use of international policy interventions such as trade sanctions and contingent transfers, to encourage sustainable resource management practices in these coun...
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We analyse the problem of finding an allocation of resources in a multiagent system that is as fair as possible in terms of minimising inequality between the utility levels enjoyed by the individual agents. We use the well-known Atkinson index to measure inequality and we focus on the distributed approach to multiagent resource allocation, where new allocations emerge as the result of a sequenc...
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In Esteban and Ray (1999, Inequality public allocation and development, Mimeo.) we formalize a model in which individuals lobby before the government in order to bene"t from some productivity-enhancing government action (infrastructures, direct subsidies, permissions, in short). The government honestly tries to allocate these permissions to the agents that will make the best use of them, as rev...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Review
سال: 2006
ISSN: 0002-8282
DOI: 10.1257/000282806776157533