Infinite populations and counterfactual frequencies in evolutionary theory
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Infinite populations and counterfactual frequencies in evolutionary theory.
One finds intertwined with ideas at the core of evolutionary theory claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations of organisms, as well as in sets of populations of organisms. One also finds claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations--of events--at the core of an answer to a question concerning the foundations of evolutionary theory...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences
سال: 2006
ISSN: 1369-8486
DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2006.03.004