Infinitely split Nash equilibrium problems in repeated games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Infinitely Split Nash Equilibrium Problems in Repeated Games
In this paper, we introduce the concept of infinitely split Nash equilibrium in repeated games in which the profile sets are chain-complete posets. Then by using a fixed point theorem on posets in [8], we prove an existence theorem. As an application, we study the repeated extended Bertrant duopoly model of price competition.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Fixed Point Theory and Applications
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1687-1812
DOI: 10.1186/s13663-018-0636-1