Influence decision models: From cooperative game theory to social network analysis

Abstract Cooperative game theory considers simple games and influence as essential classes of games. A can be viewed a model voting systems in which single alternative, such bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. An cooperative team players (or coalition) succeeds if it able to convince sufficiently many agents participate task. Furthermore, decision models allow represent discrete system dynamics graphs whose nodes are activated according spread model. It let us depth social network analysis. All these concepts applied wide variety disciplines, sciences, economics, marketing, cognitive political science, biology, computer among others. In this survey we present different advances topics, joint work with M. Serna. These include representations games, definition how characterize problems on (measures, values, properties for particular cases respect both structure graph). Moreover, also equivalent computation satisfaction power collective decision-making models, new centrality measures used addition, several interesting computational complexity results have been found.