Information Acquisition and Innovation under Competitive Pressure
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Discrete innovation, continuous improvement, and competitive pressure
Does competitive pressure foster innovation? In addressing this important question, prior studies ignored a distinction between discrete innovation aiming at entirely new technology and continuous improvement consisting of numerous incremental improvements and modifications made upon the existing technology. This paper shows that distinguishing between these two types of innovation will lead to...
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If an investor wants to form a portfolio of risky assets and can exert effort to collect information on the future value of these assets before he invests, which assets should he learn about? The best assets to acquire information about are ones the investor expects to hold. But the assets the investor holds depend on the information he observes. We build a framework to solve jointly for invest...
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متن کاملInformation acquisition and choice under uncertainty *
This paper presents a model where individuals have imperfect information and there is an opportunity cost of learning. It shows that the endogenous decision to collect costly information before taking an action has a systematic effect on choices. More precisely, consider two alternatives with ex ante identical expected payoff but different variances. The model predicts that, after the learning ...
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We develop a rational model of investors who choose which asset payoffs to acquire information about, before forming portfolios. Scale economies in information acquisition lead investors to specialize in learning about a set of highly-correlated assets. Knowing more about these assets makes them less risky and more desirable to hold. Benefits to specialization compete with benefits to diversifi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1058-6407
DOI: 10.1111/jems.12096