Information Acquisition and Welfare
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Endogenous Public Information and Welfare
This paper performs a welfare analysis of economies with private information when public information is endogenously generated and agents can condition on noisy public statistics in the rational expectations tradition. Equilibrium is not (restricted) efficient even when feasible allocations share similar properties to the market context (e.g., linear in information). The reason is that the mark...
متن کاملInformation acquisition and entry
This paper provides a framework for explicitly modeling the information gathering activities of potential entrants and analyzes how entry behavior is affected by these activities. We assume that information is acquired secretly and that firms face uncertainty about more than one variable. When costs of information gathering are small, entry decisions are as if firms had perfect information so t...
متن کاملManipulation and Information Acquisition∗
I analyze the behavior of an agent (the manipulator) who makes announcements based on his private information in order to maximize the profit from short-term trades. Truthful announcement strategies can be supported with positive probability but only if investors have another source of information in addition to the manipulator’s announcement and/or if manipulation is occasionally punished. It ...
متن کاملInformation Seeking and Reading Behavior in University of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation Sciences
Objectives: The aim of this research was to study information seeking behavior and the pattern of reading behavior of faculty members of University of Social Welfare & Rehabilitation Sciences in using printed and electronic resources. Methods: The descriptive research method was a survey method. The research was implemented by using an organized questionnaire which was distributed among the ...
متن کاملOptimal Auctions with Information Acquisition Optimal Auctions with Information Acquisition *
This paper studies optimal auction design in a private value setting with endogenous information acquisition. First, we develop a general framework for modeling information acquisition when a seller wants to sell an object to one of several potential buyers who can each gather information about their valuations prior to participation. We then show that under certain conditions, standard auction...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Economic Studies
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdu015