Information and Extremism in Elections
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Ambiguity and Extremism in Elections
We analyze a model in which voters are uncertain about the policy preferences of candidates. Two forces a¤ect the probability of electoral success: proximity to the median voter and campaign contributions. First, we show how campaign contributions a¤ect elections. Then we show how the candidates may wish to announce a range of policy preferences, rather than a single point. This strategic ambig...
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I analyse informational e¢ ciency of two-alternative elections where the utility of the voters depends on the realisation of an uncertain, binary state variable about which voters receive an independent, noisy signal. I show that large elections aggregate information e¢ ciently for any voting rule in the unique equilibrium if and only if the set of voters who favour an alternative in one state ...
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متن کاملPerspective Elections, information aggregation, and strategic voting
Elections have two distinct roles in society. First, they serve as a mechanism to decide policies when individuals disagree about appropriate actions. Second, they aggregate information dispersed in the population. This second role can be found even in situations where all individuals agree on the appropriate policies. The focus of this essay is on information aggregation in elections and on th...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
سال: 2015
ISSN: 1945-7669,1945-7685
DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130006