INFORMATION ASYMMETRY, MANUFACTURER-RETAILER CONTRACTS, AND TWO-SIDED ENTRY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Economic Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 0020-6598
DOI: 10.1111/iere.12333