Information disclosure in dynamic research contests

Expenditures and Information Disclosure in Two- Stage Political Contests

This laboratory experiment studies two-stage contests between political parties. In the first stage, parties run their primaries and in the second stage the winners of the primaries compete in the general election. The resource expenditures in the first stage by the winning candidates are partially or fully carried over to the second stage. Experimental results support all major theoretical pre...

Essays on Information Disclosure in Auctions and Contests

Dynamic Contests

Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tugof-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency …ghts) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement e¤ect. This e¤ect explains why the sum of rent-seeking e¤orts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent con‡ict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peaceful int...

Iii Abstract Dynamic Contests

Considering several main types of dynamic contests (the race, the tug-of-war, elimination contests and iterated incumbency fights) we identify a common pattern: the discouragement effect. This effect explains why the sum of rent-seeking efforts often falls considerably short of the prize that is at stake. It may cause violent conflict in early rounds, but may also lead to long periods of peacef...

Information Disclosure and Real Investment in a Dynamic Setting