منابع مشابه
Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly
-----------------------------We model an oligopolistic industry where a number of firms that are asymmetrically informed about the environment compete via quantities, and we study how the information available to a firm affects its equilibrium profits. Indeed we find that if all firms have access to the same constant returns to scale technology, in any Bayesian equilibrium the information advan...
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We embed signaling in the classical Cournot model in which several firms sell a homogeneous good. The quality is known to all the firms, but only to some buyers. The quantity-setting firms can manipulate the price to signal quality. Because there is only one price in a market for a homogeneous good, each firm incompletely controls the price-signal through the quantity decision. We characterize ...
متن کاملDuopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
Consider a symmetric differentiated duopoly model in which firms have private market data about the uncertain demand. We analyze two types of duopoly information equilibrium, Cournot and Bertrand, which emerge, respectively, from quantity and price competition, and show that the incentives for information sharing and its welfare consequences depend crucially on the type of competition, the natu...
متن کاملThe value of public information in a Cournot duopoly
We derive alternative sufficient conditions for the value of public information to be either positive or negative in a Cournot duopoly where firms technology exhibits constant returns to scale. 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D43; L13
متن کاملPartial Certifiability and Information Precision in a Cournot Game
This paper examines strategic information revelation in a Cournot duopoly with incomplete information about firm 1’s cost and information precision. Firm 2 relies on certifiable and ex post submissions of firm 1, without necessarily knowing whether firm 1 knows its cost or not. The sequential equilibria of the induced communication game are determined for different certifiability possibilities....
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Revista Brasileira de Economia
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0034-7140
DOI: 10.1590/s0034-71402003000100007