Information Provision in Procurement Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Disclosure in Open Non-Binding Procurement Auctions
We study non-binding procurement auctions where both price and nonprice characteristics of bidders matter for being awarded a contract. The outcome of such auctions critically depends on how information is distributed among bidders during the bidding process. As we show theoretically, whether it is in the buyer’s interest to disclose or to conceal non-price information depends on the precise re...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economic Theory
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1097-3923
DOI: 10.1111/jpet.12217