Information, Uncertainty & Espionage

نویسندگان

چکیده

Abstract Intelligence scholars are drawing on behavioural decision theory to improve decision-making under risk and uncertainty in intelligence counterintelligence. Such an undertaking is essentially lacking without the Austrian school’s concepts of knowledge, discovery, (entrepreneurial) judgement, ignorance, rational calculation and, more generally, its analysis human action face true uncertainty. Decision theory, both orthodox behavioural, depicts rather narrowly as a prioritisation task undertaken within delineated problem space where probabilities “sum one”. From such perspective, certain perennial challenges counterintelligence appear resolvable when fact they not, at least not approached from usual direction. We explain how can complement efforts decision-making. conclude that future strategic value located beyond information acquisition, however fast vast. agencies have no price signals help them determine much produce. And governments moderate their appetites for product. Ultimately, those recognise implications non-price institutions adapt processes may find upper hand over rivals.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: The Review of Austrian Economics

سال: 2022

ISSN: ['0889-3047', '1573-7128']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11138-022-00587-8