Informational Constraints and the Overlapping Generations Model: Folk and Anti-Folk Theorems
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Folk Theorems with Bounded
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of...
متن کاملFolk Theorems for Repeated Games
The Fudenberg and Maskin folk theorem for discounted repeated games assumes that the set of feasible payoffs is full dimensional . We obtain the same conclusion using a weaker condition. This condition is that no pair of players has equivalent von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities over outcomes. We term this condition NEU ("non-equivalent utilities"). The condition is weak, easily interpreted, and ...
متن کاملFolk Theorems with Bounded Recall
A strategy profile in a repeated game has bounded recall L if play under the profile after two distinct histories that agree in the last L periods is equal. Mailath and Morris (2002, 2006) proved that any strict equilibrium in bounded-recall strategies of a game with full support public monitoring is robust to all perturbations of the monitoring structure towards private monitoring (the case of...
متن کاملFolk Theorems on Transmission Access: Proofs and
19 a very stringent regulation. Thus, the ecient equilibrium|the economic dispatch|is realized in a way that resembles how centralized economies were expected to realize ecient allocations. The diculties with this centralized approach, in terms of information collection and incentive incompatibilities, have yet to be addressed in the specic context of transmission access. Most proposals on tran...
متن کاملThe Folk Theorems in the Framework of Evolution and Cooperation
Proceeding from the latest versions of the Folk Theorems, the present paper shows that ”natural” evolution of behavior in repeated games in human populations is a very unstable process which may be easily manipulated by outside forces. Any feasible and individually rational payoff of the game may be converted in the globally stable outcome by arbitrary small perturbation of the payoff functions...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of Economic Studies
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0034-6527,1467-937X
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937x.00038