Informational Intermediation and Competing Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informational Size and Efficient Auctions
We develop an auction model for the case of interdependent values and multidimensional signals in which agents’ signals are correlated. We provide conditions under which a modification of the Vickrey auction which includes payments to the bidders will result in an ex post efficient outcome. Furthermore, we provide a definition of informational size such that the necessary payments to bidders wi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.976343