Informed Principal Model and Contract in Supply Chain with Demand Disruption Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Mathematical Problems in Engineering
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1024-123X,1563-5147
DOI: 10.1155/2016/2306583