Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informed-principal problems in environments with generalized private values∗
We provide a solution to the problem of mechanism selection by a privately informed principal in generalized-private-value environments. In a broad class of these environments, the mechanism-selection game has a perfect-Bayesian equilibrium that has a strong neologismproofness property. Equilibrium allocations satisfying this property are characterized in terms of the players’ incentive and par...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Theoretical Economics
سال: 2012
ISSN: 1933-6837
DOI: 10.3982/te787