Informed principal with correlation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informed Principal and Countervailing Incentives
It has been shown by Maskin and Tirole (1990, proposition 11) that with quasi-linear preferences and private values, an informed principal neither gains nor loses if her private information is revealed before contracting takes place. The note shows that this result may not hold when the agent faces countervailing incentives.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.01.007